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Practice Notes
1. REM OVAL O F  SO LIC ITO R  FR O M  R EC O RD
. A matter of practical importance to solicitors, lias presented 
itself to the writer’s knowledge three times recently. The problem 
is how a solicitor, once engaged by a client and who appears 011 the 
record, max have his name removed from the record after his services 
have been dispensed with.
At first sight this appears to be an unimportant question bu t 
on study it presents several difficulties.
To the opposite party all papers and proceedings arc sufficiently 
served bv leaving with the solicitor who appears 011 the record even 
though in fact lie may 110 longer be acting for the client. I low docs 
this come about?
Mr. “A” employees solictor “X” to defend an action brought 
against him bv Mr. “ft” through solicitor “Y”. After “X” enters an 
appearance Mr. “A” decides that lie will not bother to defend and tells 
“X” that he 110 longer represents him and his scrviccs arc dispensed with.
Neither our Judicature Act nor the rules thereto make any 
provision to enable “X” to take his name from the record. There is 
provision for Mr. “A” to remove “X’s" name by substituting himself 
or another solicitor, but “X” himself is unable to do anything. Surely 
this is a rather anomalous state of affairs, where once a solicitor form­
ally acts as such for his client in any action, he remains in that capacity 
until the clicnt files the necessary papers to relieve him. Possibly if 
the client neglects or refuses to formally change his solicitor on the 
record, the solicitor is entitled to charge his client for any work he 
might have to do because of papers being served upon him, after his 
employment has been terminated.
This, however, would seem to be strctching the m atter some­
what. However, be that it may, at present a solicitor appears to be 
powerless to remove his own name from the record.
2. O R D ER  32 R U LE 6 -  JU D G E M E N T  O N  ADM ISSIONS
A recent action commenced in the King’s Bench Division of the 
Supreme Court contained a number of interesting points of practice, 
two of which are briefly presented for the information of the practit­
ioner.
SUMMARY JU D G E M E N T  O N  ADM ISSIONS W IL L  N O T  BE. 
G R A N TED  W H E R E  SUBSTANTIAL G RO U N D S O F  D E FE N C E , 
O R  A C O U N TE R C L A IM  ARE RAISED, K.C. GRASS (EN TER  
PRISES) L IM IT E D  v. M acDONALD & M cKIM
s: D.  N.B.  L A W  J O U R N A L
S.C. k.B.D. l ()il — unrcportcd.
\V. A. ('»ihhou. Solicitor for Plaintiff
II. (). McLcllan, Solicitor for Defendant» MacDonald 
k. \. W ilson. Solicitor for Defendant, McKim
lltis action anise out of a covencnt in a lease prohibiting 
assignment 01 sublett ng w ithout the consent of the lessor. The 
defendant MacDonald made an assignment to the defendant McKim 
without tust obtaining the consent of the Plaintiff company as lessor.
The plaintiff then commenced an action for possession, damages for 
breadi of covenant and mesne profits from the date of the writ till 
the date of possession.
In the course of certain applications in the action, admissions were 
made by the defendants that the assignments had been made without 
the required consent, although it was not admitted that there had been 
a forfeiture. Because of such fact the plaintiff applied for summary 
judgement for possession under Order 32 rule 6 winch reads:—
“Any party may at am stage of a causc or matter, where 
admissions of fac t have been made, either on the pleadings, 
or otherwise, apply to the Court or judge for such judgment 
or order as upon such admissions lie may be entitled to. 
without waiting for the determination of am other question 
between the parties: and the Court or a Judge mav upon 
such application make such order, oi give such judgment, 
as the Court or Judge ma\ think just."
Before the application was heard, the pleadings consisted of an 
amended Statement of Claim, Statement of Defence and Counter 
claim of MacDonald and Statement of Defence and amended Counter 
claim of McKim. The counterclaims were for relief from forfeiture 
and for damages for breach of covenant.
At the hearing the defendants raised several points which in­
cluded the waiver of the right of forfeiture In the plaintiff; the right 
of the plaintiff to maintain the action, based on the Question whether 
the covenant not to assign ran with the land, and nound unn lined 
successors in til e; the rir;ht of the defendants ft. seel: relief under the 
Landlord and ! cnant \c t; the claim for equitable relief, w hich it was 
claimed the Court had authority to grant under the Judicature \ct.
Sec. 2S {1)>, and the m atter of facts not being fullv developed before 
the Court
It w;i' ¡••'uc'J tn ’liKr that where the defendant puts forward 
a }.'■ t tu  • ?f faci oi law whi.ii max constitute a good defence, the 
C.ou t vionki not t>:dc: summary judgment and in particulai that 
wl’i e the;e r> a eouutoc'aim , the whole matter should be dealt with 
.it the trial. I
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Ilarrison J. before whom the application was made, held that 
under the circumstances where the defendants had raised the various 
points of defence and where there was a counterclaim, that summary 
judgment should not be given, but the whole m atter should be de­
veloped at the trial.
3. SEC. II JU D ICA TU R E ACT -  TRA N SFER FR O M  K IN G  S 
B EN C H  D IV ISIO N  T O  CHAN CERY D IV ISIO N  C A N N O T  BE 
O R D E R E D  BY CH AN CERY  C O U R T  JUDG E W IT H O U T  C O N ­
SENT O F  PARTIES
In the same action of Grass (Enterprises) Ltd. v. MacDonald 
et al an application was made by the plaintiff to transfer the action 
from the King’s Bench Division to the Chancery Division.
T he action being for ejectment, was properly commenced in the 
King’s Bench Division but the defendants counterclaimed for equit­
able relief. Accordingly, the plaintiffs believing such could be better 
dealt with in the Chancery Division, applied for a transfer under the 
authority of Sec. II of the Judicature Act (1950) Chapter 160 which 
is as follows:—
“If a plaintiff assigns his cause to a Division to which accord­
ing to the rules of Court, or to the Act, the same ought not to 
to be assigned, the Court or a Judge of that division may 
direct the causc or m atter to be transferred.”
W ithou t any argument on the merits of the application, Harrison J., 
held that as a Judge of the Chancery’ Division he did not have any 
authority under the Section to transfer an action commenced in the 
King’s Bench Division to the Chancery Division, without the consent 
of all parties. Accordingly, he dismissed the application.
4. In an application for attachm ent for breach of an injunction, 
the Court will require particulars of the breach to be delivered to the 
Defendants. Further, where the breach was not wilful, the payment 
of the costs of the application will be sufficient punishment and 
attachm ent will not issue against the offenders.
M ALONEY et al x. GALBRAITH et al. Hughes J.
W illiam G. Power Plaintiffs’ Solicitor 
J. Paul Barry Defendants’ Solicitor
5. W here the Defendants applied to have the action struck out 
for want of a Statement of Claim, but a Statement of Claim was served 
before the application was heard, the action was allowed to continue, 
but on the terms it be entered for trial at the next regular sitting 
of the Court.
M ALONEY et al v. GALBRAITH et al. Hughes J.
W illiam G. Power Plaintiffs’ Solicitor 
J. Paul Barry Defendants’ Solicitor
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